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WORKSHOP REPORT
The Future of NATO’s Nuclear Deterrent:
The New Strategic Concept and
the 2010 NPT Review Conference
- A Workshop Report -
From 28 February to 2 March 2010 the NATO Defense College hosted a workshop on the future of NATO’s nuclear deterrence policies in light of the Alliance’s ongoing Strategic Concept review and the May 
2010 NPT Review Conference.2  The workshop panels examined NATO de-
terrence challenges to 2020, the implications for NATO of “deep cuts” and 
“global zero,” Article 5 and the NATO Strategic Concept, the 2010 NPT Re-
view Conference, and NATO deterrence strategy “over the horizon.”  The 
main points raised in the discussions were as follows:
Several policy considerations point toward continuity in the Alliance’s 
Strategic Concept with reference to nuclear deterrence.  The Allies may 
dedicate more attention in the next Strategic Concept to nonproliferation 
and arms control and disarmament than in the current Strategic Concept, 
published in 1999; but participants agreed that the Article 5 mutual defen-
se commitment in the North Atlantic Treaty will remain central to Alliance 
security. 
1  David S. Yost is a Professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not represent those of the Department 
of the Navy, any U.S. government agency, the NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization.  In accordance with the Chatham House rule, no views are attributed 
to specifi c individuals in this report.  Thanks are owed to those who commented on earlier 
drafts of this report, including Paul Bernstein, Heinz Ferkinghoff, David Hamon, Karl-Heinz 
Kamp, Jeffrey Larsen, Joseph Pilat, Guy Roberts, Michael Rühle and Colin Stockman.
2  The principal sponsors were the NATO Defense College and the U.S. Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency.  The workshop was organized in coordination with the Nuclear Poli-
cy Directorate at NATO HQ. The workshop participants included members of the Nuclear 
Planning Group Staff Group, senior NATO staff offi cials, members of national delegations to 
NATO, national foreign and defense ministry representatives, and policy analysis experts. 
The nearly 80 participants included representatives of 20 of the 28 NATO member nations.
●
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The Alliance’s nuclear-sharing arrangements, based 
on U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and U.S. and al-
lied dual-capable aircraft, were challenged by some 
participants as no longer necessary, but fi rmly en-
dorsed by other participants.  The latter participants 
— including several from Turkey and Eastern Europe 
— saw a compelling case for maintaining this element 
of the Alliance’s overall nuclear deterrence posture.
Reconciling nuclear disarmament aspirations with 
extended nuclear deterrence, including the Alliance’s 
nuclear deterrence posture in Europe, presents a con-
tinuing challenge.  Some participants expressed con-
cern that nuclear disarmament aspirations could crea-
te pressures for near-term decisions with far-reaching 
political, strategic, and psychological effects, notably 
with respect to the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in 
Europe.  Others stated that NATO needs to strongly 
support nonproliferation, arms control, and disarma-
ment, and that this is consistent with the Alliance’s 
nuclear deterrence policy.
The NATO Allies have multiple interests in promoting 
nuclear nonproliferation and the success of the May 
2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Pro-
liferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).  These include 
upholding the legality and legitimacy of NATO nuclear-
sharing policies as well as the record of the Alliance 
and its three nuclear-armed members in compliance 
with Article VI of the NPT.  The Allies are also inte-
rested in strengthening the effectiveness of the NPT 
regime, notably with respect to Articles III, IV, and X.
The shortcomings and potential fragility of the non-
proliferation regime have led NATO Allies to reaffi rm 
the importance of the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence 
posture in relation to regional powers armed with (or 
seeking) weapons of mass destruction.
The NATO Allies are divided in their assessments of 
Russian policy trends and in their prescriptions for de-
aling with Russia. 
The NATO Allies recognize the growing importance 
for their security of China’s increasing military and nu-
clear capabilities and of Asia-Pacifi c security trends, 
but the participants in this workshop drew few inferen-
ces for NATO policy other than taking note of these 
trends. 
The following report elaborates on these key conclusions.
KEY INSIGHTS AND OBSERVATIONS
Several policy considerations point toward continui-
ty in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept with reference 
to nuclear deterrence.  The Allies may dedicate more 
attention in the next Strategic Concept to nonproli-
feration and arms control and disarmament than in 
the current Strategic Concept, published in 1999; but 
participants agreed that the Article 5 mutual defense 
commitment in the North Atlantic Treaty will remain 
central to Alliance security. 
While recognizing the importance of new security challen-
ges, workshop participants saw no requirement to revise 
the defi nition of Article 5 in the new Strategic Concept in 
order to encompass new challenges such as cyber warfa-
re or energy security.  They also supported retaining many 
of the essential principles dealing with nuclear deterren-
ce.  While the participants favored more systematic as-
sessments of new security challenges, including whether 
and to what extent military and nuclear capabilities are 
relevant to dealing with them, they clearly did not rule out 
the continuing requirement for the Alliance to be prepared 
to deal with “old threats” of coercion and aggression.
An American participant said that the Allies should be 
“careful about rewriting or reinterpreting Article 5 on the 
grounds that the current language — for example, its spe-
cifi c mention of ‘armed attack’ — is somehow inadequate 
to capture potential 21st century security threats such as 
cyber attack or the manipulation of energy supplies for po-
litical purposes.”  His view that the existing treaty langua-
ge “gives the Allies all the fl exibility they need to invoke 
a decision to act collectively” was generally endorsed by 
the workshop participants.  An Estonian participant said 









and specifi c” terms “might lead to a situation where some 
challenge that is perceived by a member state as existen-
tial has nonetheless remained out of the enumeration of 
threats potentially invoking Article 5.”  Nuclear deterrence 
has little or no role with regard to new threats such as 
cyber warfare, some participants said; but they agreed 
that it remains an essential element of the Alliance’s se-
curity posture. 
Several participants said that principles such as burden-
sharing, upholding nuclear deterrence, maintaining the 
transatlantic link, and providing for allied participation 
matter both for alliance cohesion and deterrence; and that 
these principles are likely to be included in the new Stra-
tegic Concept.
An American participant said that the arrangements ba-
sed on U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and U.S. and 
allied dual-capable aircraft constitute a form of burden-
sharing in the nuclear deterrence mission that could not 
easily be replaced.  Three measures might be considered, 
he suggested, to enhance burden-sharing in the absence 
of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe:  a more integrated 
NATO Response Force, with common funding and orga-
nic airlift; a multinational high-alert fi ghter wing; and inte-
grated ballistic missile defenses based on the Standard 
Missile 3 interceptor and other systems proposed by the 
Obama administration.  Even if these measures could be 
instituted, however, it is clear that they would not have 
the unique political and strategic signifi cance of nuclear 
sharing in the Alliance’s deterrence posture.
A French participant suggested six criteria for considera-
tion in debating and drafting the elements of the new Stra-
tegic Concept dealing with nuclear deterrence:  (1) The 
posture must deter potential adversaries. (2) The posture 
must not undermine relations with non-adversaries.  (3) 
The posture must reassure Allies.  (4) The posture must 
be acceptable to allied publics. (5) The posture should en-
tail no net loss for the objective of non-proliferation.  (6) 
The posture should maintain “a common culture of deter-
rence” in NATO.  Moreover, he said, while missile defen-
ses will never provide a complete substitute for nuclear 
deterrence, their importance for deterrence — including 
extended deterrence — appears likely to grow.
A British participant said that, despite the support for “no 
fi rst use” or “sole purpose” pledges in non-governmen-
tal organizations, there does not seem to be “any great 
interest” in such concepts in NATO governments.  It is 
therefore unlikely that the Alliance will rule out response 
options by making such a pledge.  The Allies may in this 
regard retain language similar to that in the 1999 Strategic 
Concept:  “The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces 
of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent 
coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfi l 
an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of 
any aggressor about the nature of the Allies’ response to 
military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of 
any kind is not a rational option.” 3
Another British participant said, “At some level this debate 
is about the European political class and its willingness to 
lead public opinion, resist activism and demonstrations, 
and build support around policies which produce the most 
stability.”  In his view, advocating the removal of the re-
maining U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe would “fur-
ther shift the burden of responsibility, and spending, to the 
Americans, because Europeans fi nd it distasteful to think 
about the strategic realities behind their fortunate security. 
. . Ethically, are Europeans entitled to continue with ‘moral 
burden shedding’?”
The Alliance’s nuclear-sharing arrangements, based 
on U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and U.S. and allied 
dual-capable aircraft, were challenged by some parti-
cipants as no longer necessary, but fi rmly endorsed 
by other participants.  The latter participants — inclu-
ding several from Turkey and Eastern Europe — saw 
a compelling case for maintaining this element of the 
Alliance’s overall nuclear deterrence posture.
3  North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, par. 62, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/offi cial_texts_27433.htm
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Since the 1950s, U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe have 
furnished the practical basis for burden-sharing and mea-
ningful consultations among the Allies about NATO’s nu-
clear deterrence policy.4  Several workshop participants 
said that the presence of nuclear as well as conventional 
U.S. forces in Europe will remain vital to NATO’s secu-
rity and the preservation of peace.  In their view, dual-
capable aircraft (DCA) from multiple Allies make possible 
a demonstration of collective resolve that could be of cri-
tical importance for successful crisis management, even 
though — as the 1999 Strategic Concept noted — “The 
circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might 
have to be contemplated . . . are . . . extremely remote.” 5
Moreover, the Alliance’s long-standing habits of coopera-
tion and consultations in the nuclear domain would not 
have the same signifi cance without the nuclear-sharing 
arrangements based on U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. 
Workshop participants from across the Alliance, including 
from member nations such as the Baltic states, the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom, de-
scribed maintaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe as 
“absolutely pertinent.”  
An Italian participant noted that Russia has a “conside-
rable” number of nuclear weapons based in Europe, and 
that any change in NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture 
would raise questions that would have to be answered “in 
a convincing way.”
Some participants noted that the “basing countries,” also 
known as the DCA countries, which host U.S. nuclear we-
apons and dual-capable aircraft and provide DCA of their 
own, feel “less exposed” to threats than do some of the 
new Allies.
An American participant said that NATO’s arrangements 
have involved “a genuine shared ownership of the benefi ts, 
the burdens and the risks of extended deterrence,” owing 
to the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and 
Allied “nuclear delivery systems and to the establishment 
of collective consultation and planning arrangements, a 
situation particular to NATO, without anything equivalent 
existing among the United States’ Pacifi c region allies.”  As 
a result, any move away from this arrangement would “im-
mediately raise core issues regarding NATO’s identity in 
both its transatlantic and collective dimensions.”  It would 
be a mistake, he said, to consider nuclear-sharing “in a 
vacuum,” as if it could be separated from other aspects of 
the NATO collective defense, deterrence, and crisis ma-
nagement posture.
A German participant said that, aside from their deter-
rent value and potential operational signifi cance in a cri-
sis, U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe are “of the utmost 
symbolic importance” as a means for burden-sharing and 
as a demonstration of the seriousness of the U.S. commit-
ment to Alliance security.  Some politicians in Germany 
are motivated, he added, by calculations of what policy 
direction would please public opinion, which is predomi-
nantly hostile to all things nuclear, including reactors for 
generating electricity.
A Polish participant said, “We were very unhappy with the 
three no’s when the Founding Act was signed,” because it 
implied “a secondary membership for some Allies.”  Ano-
ther Pole said that the NATO-Russia Founding Act langua-
ge implied “an unequal security status” for Poland and the 
other new Allies.  At a minimum, he said, the Allies should 
uphold the commitment in the NATO-Russia Founding Act 
not to change NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture,6  and 
ensure that the new Allies have equality in contingency 
4  As some workshop participants noted, NATO’s deterrence posture includes elements other than nuclear forces, such as conventional military 
capabilities, missile defenses, and consequence management assets.
5  North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, par. 64.
6  “The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new 
members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy — and do not foresee any future need to do so.” Foun-




7  As an example of how NATO communicated uncertainty as to its potential responses during the Cold War, he cited a West German policy state-
ment:  “The initial tactical use of nuclear weapons must be timed as late as possible but as early as necessary, which is to say that the doctrine of 
Forward Defence must retain its validity, the conventional forces of the defender must not be exhausted, and incalculability must be sustained so 
far as the attacker is concerned.” White Paper 1975/1976:  The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal 
Armed Forces (Bonn:  Press and Information Offi ce of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1975), p. 20, par. 38.
8  James R. Schlesinger, chairman, Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase II: Review of 
the DoD Nuclear Mission (Arlington, VA: Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, December 2008), p. 60. This 
report is available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/PhaseIIReportFinal.pdf
planning and infrastructure for collective defense.
An American participant said that the historical strengths 
of NATO’s deterrence posture have included retaining 
multiple options and reserving the right to make use of 
them as necessary.  That is, the Allies have not ruled out 
options by making “no fi rst use” or “sole purpose” pledges, 
and they have refused to be pinned down on what they 
might do in hypothetical scenarios. 7
Some participants discerned a divide among the Euro-
pean Allies.  With regard to the remaining U.S. nuclear 
weapons in Europe, a British participant said, “it is entirely 
possible that it might not matter if they were withdrawn 
— for some nations and for some time. But, equally, it’s 
impossible to dismiss the possibilities of severe political 
impact elsewhere on other nations, newer in membership 
and closer to the edge of the Alliance. It simply cannot 
make sense to insist that, psychologically, there would be 
no impact, when everything we’ve heard here, plus the 
public diplomatic positions of Poland and the Baltic Sta-
tes, argues that people in those countries feel profoundly 
differently.”  An American participant pointed out that the-
re is continuing support for the current nuclear deterrence 
posture in governments across the Alliance, and not only 
in Eastern Europe and Turkey.
Another British participant said that removing the remai-
ning U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe would not bring 
about the Alliance’s collapse, but it could have conse-
quences for alliance cohesion and solidarity.  Referring to 
the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, he said, 
“If people think they’re important, they’re important.”
An American participant noted that the arguments for re-
moving the weapons rule out entirely what cannot be fully 
excluded:  the possibility that a contingency could arise in 
which the Alliance’s possession of a multinational nucle-
ar deterrent posture could be relevant for successful cri-
sis management and deterrence.  These arguments also 
overstate the “opportunity costs” and fi nancial investments 
required to maintain the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence po-
sture.  According to the Report of the Secretary of Defen-
se Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, 
the cost of maintaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe is 
“low and worth paying” as the price of an Alliance deter-
rent with transatlantic risk- and responsibility-sharing.8
An Estonian participant said that for his country protec-
tion via U.S. extended deterrence was “the main reason to 
join the Alliance.”  His government understands, he said, 
that extended deterrence should not be equated with the 
presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe; but Esto-
nian experts and offi cials “do not like the idea of removing 
them” because it could create widespread “perceptions” 
of a U.S. abandonment of the defense of Europe.  Before 
the Alliance thinks of removing the U.S. nuclear weapons, 
it should fi rst answer a number of questions:  Above all, 
what kinds of measures, if any, could fi ll the gap created 
by the withdrawal of the U.S. weapons?  What mechani-
sms and structures could replace what would be remo-
ved?  How exactly would the removal of the weapons con-
tribute to NATO’s security?  All the Allies are interested, 
he concluded, in maintaining the transatlantic link and the 
U.S. security commitment in Europe.
Reconciling nuclear disarmament aspirations with 
extended nuclear deterrence, including the Allian-
ce’s nuclear deterrence posture in Europe, presents 
a continuing challenge.  Some participants expressed 
concern that nuclear disarmament aspirations could 
create pressures for near-term decisions with far re-
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9   Remarks by President Barack Obama, Prague, Czech Republic, 5 April 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_offi ce/Remar-
ks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/
10  The foreign ministers of Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway sent the letter to the NATO Secretary General on 26 
February 2010. The letter is available at the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands: http://www.minbuza.nl/dsresource?obje
ctid=buzabeheer:200281&type=org
11  The key sentence in the coalition agreement might be translated as follows:  “In this context, and in the drafting of a new NATO Strategic Con-
cept, we will engage within the Alliance, as well as across the table with the American Allies, such that the remaining nuclear weapons in Germany 
are removed.”  “In diesem Zusammenhang sowie im Zuge der Ausarbeitung eines strategischen Konzeptes der NATO werden wir uns im Bündnis 
sowie gegenüber den amerikanischen Verbündeten dafür einsetzen, dass die in Deutschland verbliebenen Atomwaffen abgezogen werden.” 
Wachstum.Bildung.Zusammenhalt: Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP, 17 Legislaturperiode, 26 Oktober 2009, p. 120.
aching political, strategic, and psychological effects, 
notably with respect to the remaining U.S. nuclear we-
apons in Europe.  Others stated that NATO needs to 
strongly support nonproliferation, arms control, and 
disarmament, and that this is consistent with the Al-
liance’s nuclear deterrence policy.
In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama re-
affi rmed long-standing U.S. policies.  While expressing 
“clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to 
seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear 
weapons,” he reaffi rmed the commitment of the United 
States to maintain extended nuclear deterrence protec-
tion for its allies.  “As long as these [nuclear] weapons 
exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and 
effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee 
that defense to our allies.” 9  President Obama presented 
the objectives of pursuing disarmament while maintaining 
deterrence as coherent and consistent policy goals, and 
made no reference to U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.
An Italian participant said that President Obama’s Prague 
speech had nonetheless created “a profound impression” 
in Europe and had placed political pressure on the U.S. 
nuclear weapons presence in Europe.  As a result, he 
said, NATO policy has to take into account the aspiration 
for nuclear force reductions and disarmament with an am-
bitious arms control agenda, including the Comprehensi-
ve Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
A Czech participant deplored the February 2010 proposal 
by the foreign ministers of fi ve NATO countries to discuss 
what NATO could do to advance the goal of nuclear disar-
mament. 10  He said that this proposal could be seen as 
a “problematic” initiative to remove U.S. nuclear weapons 
from Europe “without reciprocation or attention to the stra-
tegic context of Russia and Iran.”  In his view, the U.S. nu-
clear weapons in Europe constitute “a vital demonstration 
of U.S. commitment,” and it is not clear what measures 
could “offset the losses” for Alliance security that would be 
inherent in a removal of these weapons.
A German participant said that both the statement by the 
fi ve foreign ministers and the October 2009 coalition agre-
ement of the new CDU/CSU-FDP government in Berlin 
could “backfi re” and fail to achieve their intended objec-
tive.11  The coalition government’s ostensible objective 
in advocating the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from 
Germany is — like that of the fi ve foreign ministers — to 
contribute to disarmament and nonproliferation by sen-
ding the following message to the NPT Review Conferen-
ce:  NATO is reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons.  In 
practice, however, when all the Allies — including those in 
Eastern Europe and Turkey — examine the implications 
of the initiative for deterrence and alliance cohesion, the 
result may be a reaffi rmation of the importance of nucle-
ar deterrence in the Alliance’s strategy and force posture. 
Other participants saw no inconsistency between the Al-
liance’s ongoing reduction in reliance on nuclear weapons 
and the continuing need for a nuclear deterrence posture 
based in part on U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.
A German participant said that “global zero” advocacy “is 
bringing out the worst in European politics:  it serves as a 
convenient alibi for politicians to argue for the withdrawal 
of certain weapons — without any reference to Alliance 
concerns, military-operational issues, or the emerging 
strategic environment.”  If the remaining U.S. nuclear we-
apons in Europe were withdrawn, he said, NATO would 
“lose much of its ‘nuclear culture’” and the political cohe-
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12  Moscow seems to have accepted NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, including the NATO Nuclear Planning Group and the bilateral programs 
of cooperation involving the United States and non-nuclear-weapon-state NATO Allies, as consistent with the NPT because of U.S. assurances 
that these arrangements would not enable the Federal Republic of Germany to become a nuclear power.
13  The U.S. Secretary of State wrote at the time to the President, “It does not deal with arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons within 
allied territory as these do not involve any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at 
which time the treaty would no longer be controlling.”  “Report by Secretary of State [Dean] Rusk to President [Lyndon] Johnson on the Nonprolife-
ration Treaty, July 2, 1968,” in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1968 (Washington D.C.:  Government 
Printing Offi ce, 1969), p. 478.
sion that is derived from maintaining a multinational nucle-
ar deterrence posture; and the three nuclear-armed Allies 
would come under “moral pressure” from the rest of the 
Allies to disarm, with “a corrosive effect both on transat-
lantic and intra-European relations.”  The withdrawal of 
the U.S. weapons would, however, have “zero” positive 
effect on non-proliferation or nuclear disarmament.
A French participant said that expressing interest in aboli-
tion undermines the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence and 
thereby erodes extended deterrence and assurance.  In 
his view, advocates of a “lead by example” approach to 
nuclear disarmament are “living in an ivory tower.”  Deter-
rence remains, he said, one of the advantages of keeping 
U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe:  “The Russians must not 
think that there is zero nuclear risk if they do something in 
their neighborhood.”
An American participant said that U.S. and NATO declara-
tory policy must simultaneously communicate two messa-
ges:  “Policy must reassure both that nuclear deterrence 
will continue as long as existential threats remain, and 
that the aim is to create conditions to eliminate such exi-
stential threats, including nuclear weapons.”  The cause 
of nuclear disarmament could be advanced, he said, by 
strengthening non-nuclear forms of extended deterrence, 
including conventional military capabilities.  In his judg-
ment, “Almost all realistic threats to allies would not be of 
a scale that would in fact justify or prompt the U.S. actually 
to use nuclear weapons.”
Another American challenged this view and said that this 
argument “breaks down” the logic of extended deterren-
ce, and that it would be “catastrophic” if the United States 
implied that it was not prepared to take nuclear risks if 
necessary to defend a NATO ally.  
The NATO Allies have multiple interests in promo-
ting nuclear nonproliferation and the success of the 
May 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).  The-
se include upholding the legality and legitimacy of 
NATO nuclear-sharing policies as well as the record 
of the Alliance and its three nuclear-armed members 
in compliance with Article VI of the NPT.  The Allies 
are also interested in strengthening the effectiveness 
of the NPT regime, notably with respect to Articles III, 
IV, and X.
A German participant said that the NATO Allies should 
have long ago initiated formal consultations on their po-
sitions in anticipation of the upcoming Review Conferen-
ce. The NATO Allies have never established a “NATO 
caucus,” however, or made any effort to coordinate their 
positions at NPT Review Conferences.  They have only 
prepared fact sheets about the Alliance’s policies, in order 
to be able to respond promptly to misinformation.
Although the United States and its NATO Allies made their 
nuclear-sharing policy clear at the time the NPT was con-
cluded (and the policy was accepted by the Soviet Union 
and other parties to the treaty at the time),12  some critics 
hold that the policy is inconsistent with the non-transfer 
principles in Articles I and II of the NPT.  The Allies counter 
this argument by pointing out that in peacetime the wea-
pons are under the direct positive control of the United 
States in highly secure storage sites, and would not be 
transferred to NATO Allies except in time of war, when 
the NPT would no longer apply.13  Some governments 
may propose amending the NPT to make it applicable in 
wartime, but the treaty amendment process would be pro-
tracted and diffi cult and would raise the risk of weakening 
the NPT regime through additional amendments.  The 
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14  See National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Washington, DC:  U.S. Secretary of Energy and U.S. Secretary of Defense, 
September 2008), pp. 1, 6-7, available at http://www.defense.gov/news/nuclearweaponspolicy.pdf.  For a discussion of the expansion and moder-
nization of China’s nuclear forces, see Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC:  Offi ce of 
the Secretary of Defense, 2009), pp. 24-25, available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf
15  The Additional Protocol is a legal instrument that supplements existing safeguards and grants the IAEA expanded rights of access and inspec-
tion concerning declared and undeclared sites and activities.  For background, see “IAEA Safeguards Overview:  Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreements and Additional Protocols,” available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html
approval of such an amendment proposal at the Review 
Conference is therefore unlikely.
Despite the signifi cant reductions in British, French, and 
U.S. nuclear forces since the end of the Cold War (and the 
drastic reductions in U.S. nuclear forces in Europe), pro-
ponents of nuclear disarmament will probably also criticize 
NATO’s three nuclear weapon states and the Alliance as 
a whole for what disarmament advocates regard as insuf-
fi cient progress in meeting the requirements of Article VI 
of the NPT:  “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes 
to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on ge-
neral and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control.”  Article VI has long been a rather 
contentious issue in NPT diplomacy, but it has become 
more politically divisive since the end of the Cold War. 
Some disarmament advocates argue that non-nuclear-
weapon state parties to the treaty may seek nuclear we-
apons unless the NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states 
(Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States) set 
a positive example by undertaking more ambitious efforts 
consistent with Article VI.  Other proponents of disarma-
ment see a link between further progress on Article VI and 
the prospects for increased cooperation on strengthening 
the nonproliferation regime.  Russia and the United States 
have negotiated a follow-on to the START Treaty, while 
China is the only NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon state 
engaged in expanding its nuclear arsenal.14 
Some governments regard the Principles and Objectives 
agreed at the 1995 Review Conference and the Thirteen 
Steps listed at the 2000 Review Conference as “commit-
ments,” whereas others regard them as “targets.”  The 
distinction is to a great extent moot for the Alliance.  All 
NATO governments support the ratifi cation of the Com-
prehensive Test Ban Treaty and its entry into force, as 
well as the initiation of negotiations on a Fissile Material 
Cutoff Treaty.  China, Iran, and Pakistan are blocking di-
scussions on an FMCT, not the United States or any of the 
other NATO Allies.
NATO’s stake in the NPT Review Conference extends to 
positive goals in addition to being prepared to respond 
to criticisms that the Allies may encounter.  An American 
participant noted that the Allies have an interest in measu-
res designed to strengthen the NPT regime.  It would be 
advantageous, for example, to enhance the effectiveness 
and effi ciency of IAEA safeguards, including efforts to ob-
tain universal acceptance of the Additional Protocol as the 
new standard for safeguards;15  to fully utilize all existing 
safeguards, including special inspections; and to consider 
the possible need for new authorities.  It is important to en-
sure that Article IV, particularly with regard to the right “to 
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes,” is implemented in a manner fully 
consistent with Articles I and II of the Treaty.  A practical 
priority in this regard is meaningful progress on promoting 
new fuel cycle approaches that limit the spread of indige-
nous enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.  Finally, 
there is a need to obtain agreement on an interpretation 
of Article X that limits a state’s ability to withdraw from the 
treaty without suffering any consequences.  
The NPT Review Conference, a British participant said, 
offers an example of “dysfunctional multilateralism.” It is 
inherently diffi cult to reach agreement on a consensus fi -
nal document in plenary sessions involving 150 or more 
states.  While the media would present a consensus fi nal 
document as a success, it is not clear whether such an 
agreement would in fact make a difference to the effecti-
veness of the NPT regime. 
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The shortcomings and potential fragility of the non-
proliferation regime have led NATO Allies to reaffi rm 
the importance of the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence 
posture in relation to regional powers armed with (or 
seeking) weapons of mass destruction.
The NPT regime has been placed into question most re-
cently by Iran, which has violated safeguards and IAEA 
and UN Security Council requirements with impunity. It 
would nonetheless not be easy to isolate Iran at the NPT 
Review Conference.  When the Board of Governors of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency voted in November 
2009 to express concern over Iran’s having built a uranium 
enrichment facility at Qom in violation of its obligations 
and to call on Iran to confi rm that it has not authorized 
construction of any other undeclared nuclear facilities, th-
ree countries (Cuba, Malaysia and Venezuela) supported 
Iran and six (Afghanistan, Brazil, Egypt, Pakistan, South 
Africa and Turkey) abstained. 16  
Other important proliferation challenges include North Ko-
rea and Syria.  North Korea withdrew from the NPT wi-
thout penalty.  The Pyongyang regime sees the country’s 
de facto status as a nuclear-weapon state as a guarantee 
of survival, and it is therefore unlikely to abandon it.  Syria 
has stonewalled recent IAEA requests for answers about 
its activities.  Both cases show, as an American partici-
pant put it, the “failure of compliance and enforcement 
mechanisms.”
An American participant noted that the 1999 Strategic Con-
cept included a reference to the Alliance’s “forces” — pre-
sumably including its nuclear forces — “deterring the use 
of NBC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] weapons.” 17 
A Turkish participant said that the Turks had been con-
cerned about a weakening of Article 5 after the end of 
the Cold War, and have been pleased to see that the new 
Allies admitted since 1999 have revived its central im-
portance.  Despite having some sympathy for proposals 
for a Middle East free of nuclear weapons, the Turkish 
government would oppose the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear 
weapons, and not only because of their “symbolic” value. 
Turkey is not interested in seeking nuclear weapons of its 
own, and would prefer to rely on continued U.S. extended 
nuclear deterrence guarantees and fi rmer enforcement 
of nonproliferation safeguards and associated measures, 
such as export controls.  U.S. extended deterrence, based 
in part on U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, has been a 
major source of assurance and restraint for Turkey.  Ho-
wever, owing in part to efforts to cultivate a more positive 
relationship with Iran and to manage the high level of anti-
American sentiment in Turkey since the Iraq war, the Tur-
kish government has been cautious about expressing its 
continuing support for U.S. nuclear deterrence protection 
through NATO.
A British participant said that he had reached similar con-
clusions on the basis of his interviews with Turkish offi cials 
and experts.  That is, owing in part to Turkish concerns 
about the Iranian situation, now would be “the wrong time” 
to withdraw U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe.
The NATO Allies are divided in their assessments of 
Russian policy trends and in their prescriptions for 
dealing with Russia.  
Western European Allies are more likely to draw attention 
to errors in U.S. and NATO policy in dealing with Russia, 
and to support steps intended to promote arms control and 
disarmament, such as reducing or eliminating the remai-
ning U.S. nuclear weapons presence in Europe.  Eastern 
European Allies tend to emphasize threatening aspects 
of Russian behavior and to call for continuity in maintai-
16  Mark Heinrich, “IAEA votes to censure Iran over nuclear cover-up,” Reuters, 27 November 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE5AQ1BZ20091127.  The Malaysian government subsequently dismissed the delegate who had cast the vote supporting Iran and said 
that he had disregarded his instructions. Mark Heinrich, “Malaysia dismisses IAEA envoy after Iran atomic vote,” Reuters, 9 February 2010, avai-
lable at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61856820100209
17  North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, par. 41.
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ning and strengthening the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence 
posture, including the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons 
in Europe.  Some workshop participants warned against 
overstating these differences among the Allies, because 
all the Allies are interested in carrying forward relations 
with Russia in a positive way.
Several workshop participants noted that Russia has for 
years been engaged in modernizing its nuclear forces and 
has also shown a willingness to employ energy resources 
and cyber capabilities for political intimidation and coer-
cion. An American participant said that the Allies need 
to balance close cooperation with Russia and the requi-
rements of deterrence.  Beyond this general principle of 
balance, differences among the workshop participants 
concerning Russia policy stood out.
A Polish participant described the idea of withdrawing the 
remaining U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe as “incredi-
bly dangerous” on two grounds:  the need for the Alliance 
to maintain its political cohesion and the imperative for 
NATO to retain an “in kind” capability in Europe to deter 
Russia.  He noted that Russian military doctrine has re-
cently reaffi rmed the importance of nuclear weapons, and 
said that removing the U.S. nuclear weapons would put 
an end to “one of the pillars of the Alliance” — meaningful 
consultations and exercises about U.S. extended deter-
rence commitments.  He asked, “Who outside France or 
Britain would believe in their extended deterrence?”
A German participant said that all the Allies should be 
concerned with assuring the newer Allies of the “reliabi-
lity of protection” through NATO, but should take care to 
“avoid an anti-Russia focus” in engaging in contingency 
planning for all Allies.  The challenge in the new Strategic 
Concept, as with the Harmel Report in 1967, will be to fi nd 
the appropriate balance between deterrence and defense, 
on the one hand, and dialogue and openness to coopera-
tion, on the other.  In current circumstances, these have 
often been summed up as the “reset” and “reassurance” 
tasks — that is, reestablishing positive relations with Rus-
sia while assuring the newer Allies of the dependability of 
NATO’s collective defense commitments.
An Estonian participant said that the divergence in views 
among the NATO Allies on relations with Russia should 
not be overstated.   The new Allies are all interested in 
carrying forward relations with Moscow in a positive way 
and strongly support the NATO Secretary General’s ini-
tiative for a NATO-Russia Joint Review of 21st Century 
Common Security Challenges.
A British participant noted that Russia’s February 2010 
military doctrine gives NATO “top billing” among exter-
nal dangers,18  and that Moscow has repeatedly affi rmed 
a policy of not ruling out the preemptive use of nuclear 
weapons.19  The diffi culties in relations with Russia, he 
said, include “the conspiratorial view of more or less eve-
rything” taken by Russian leaders and the assumption that 
the country deserves more recognition and deference as 
a great power on the basis of its history, resources, and 
territorial extent.  Many Russians regard the NATO en-
largement process as threatening and foresee the emer-
gence of threats to what they deem legitimate Russian 
claims in other areas.  Many Russians, he said, consider 
a sphere of infl uence in the Arctic “rightful compensation 
for the loss of Eastern Europe.”  An American added that 
it is diffi cult to discern an “end point” for the current tra-
jectory of Russian truculence, and that the Alliance may 
witness “even bigger ‘Zapad’ exercises [involving Russian 
18  The fi rst of the “main external military dangers” listed in Russia’s new military doctrine is NATO’s “desire to endow the force potential of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with global functions carried out in violation of the norms of international law and to move the military 
infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by expanding the bloc.”  See “The Military 
Doctrine of the Russian Federation” approved by Russian Federation presidential edict on 5 February 2010, Offi cial website of the Russian Fede-
ration president; URL: http://kremlin.ru/, English translation at OpenSource.gov, CEP20100208042001
19  In October 2009, Nikolai Patrushev, the head of the Russian Security Council, said, “In situations critical for national security, a nuclear strike, 
including a pre-emptive one, against an aggressor is not ruled out.”  Patrushev interview in Izvestia, reported by RIA Novosti, 14 October 2009, 
available at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20091014/156461160.html (accessed 15 February 2010).
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nuclear forces] and more unease in Russia’s immediate 
neighbors” in Europe.20
Moreover, another British participant said, NATO Europe’s 
placid “acceptance of the theater nuclear imbalance could 
change if, sometime in the future, the Russians, delibera-
tely or unsystematically, decided to raise the salience of 
that category of weapons,” perhaps with “well-publicized 
and photographed Zapad exercises, explicitly featuring 
early nuclear release.”
A Polish participant said that the United States and the Al-
liance have recently modifi ed their missile defense plans 
and effectively halted the NATO enlargement process as 
concerns Georgia and Ukraine.  In his view, “a process 
of endless appeasement” could lead to “Finlandization,” 
as the term was used during the Cold War to describe 
the exceptional status of Finland in relation to the Soviet 
Union.  Allies in central and eastern Europe are, he said, 
uncertain about the reliability of NATO commitments and 
concerned about the risk that some Allies might purchase 
security at their expense.
A British participant said that some Western European Al-
lies are “keen to demonstrate movement on arms control 
and disarmament.” At the same time, another British par-
ticipant added, some offi cials and experts in allied gover-
nments are wary of initiating an arms control negotiation 
with Russia about non-strategic nuclear weapons because 
this would tie the level of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe 
to Russia, when the rationale for these weapons is not 
linked solely to hypothetical Russian contingencies (and, 
by the same token, the Russians have grounds for main-
taining non-strategic weapons other than NATO).  Moreo-
ver, an actual negotiation with Russia could limit NATO’s 
latitude, subject the Alliance to Russian negotiating tacti-
cs calculated to divide the Allies, pose great verifi cation 
diffi culties, and raise modernization requirements.  The 
“enormous stockpile” of non-strategic nuclear weapons 
in Russia nonetheless makes it “hard,” he concluded, for 
NATO to simply withdraw its weapons in the non-strategic 
category.  The likelihood of the Russian government un-
dertaking reductions in its non-strategic weapons or even 
agreeing to discuss them in any detail with the United Sta-
tes or NATO is remote.21
An American participant noted that if the U.S. nuclear we-
apons presence were withdrawn from Europe unilaterally, 
the Russians would have fewer incentives to accept any 
negotiated measures affecting their non-strategic wea-
pons, including any verifi cation or transparency regime. 
The assumption of some disarmament advocates that 
withdrawing the remaining U.S. weapons from Europe 
would encourage the Russians to eliminate or substan-
tially reduce their large holdings of non-strategic nuclear 
forces appears to be based on an excessively sanguine 
view of Moscow’s readiness to undertake action in this re-
spect.  As the Congressional Commission noted, Moscow 
has not complied with the 1991-1992 pledges by Soviet 
President Mikhail Gorbachev and Russian President Bo-
ris Yeltsin to eliminate and reduce certain types of non-
strategic nuclear forces.22 
20  See, for example, Matthew Day, “Russia ‘Simulates’ Nuclear Attack on Poland,” The Daily Telegraph, 1 November 2009, available at http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/poland/6480227/Russia-simulates-nuclear-attack-on-Poland.html
21  According to the U.S. Congressional Commission, “Some allies located near Russia believe that U.S. non-strategic forces in Europe are 
essential to prevent nuclear coercion by Moscow and indeed that modernized U.S./NATO forces are essential for restoring a sense of balance 
in the face of Russia’s nuclear renewal. . . [B]alance does not exist in non-strategic nuclear forces, where Russia enjoys a sizeable numerical 
advantage. As noted above, it stores thousands of these weapons in apparent support of possible military operations west of the Urals. The United 
States deploys a small fraction of that number in support of nuclear sharing agreements in NATO. . . . Strict U.S.-Russian equivalence in NSNF 
numbers is unnecessary. But the current imbalance is stark and worrisome to some U.S. allies in Central Europe. If and as reductions continue in 
the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, this imbalance will become more apparent and allies less assured.” America’s 
Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, William J. Perry, Chairman, 
and James R. Schlesinger, Vice-Chairman (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), pp. 20-21, available at http://www.
usip.org/strategic_posture/fi nal.html
22  In the words of the Congressional Commission, Russia “is no longer in compliance with its PNI [Presidential Nuclear Initiative] commitments.” 
America’s Strategic Posture:  The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, p. 13.  For 
background on Russia’s PNI commitments regarding this broad category of nuclear forces, see David S. Yost, “Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear 
Forces,” International Affairs, vol. 77 (July 2001), pp. 531-551.
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A German participant said that the NATO Allies have 
“some reason for self-criticism” in the deterioration of 
relations with Russia — for instance, failing to “cushion” 
the NATO enlargement process in deference to Russian 
sensitivities, pursuing a missile defense plan that Moscow 
considered threatening, and walking out of the NATO-Rus-
sia Council over the Georgia-Russia war.  The Allies must 
nonetheless, he said, “present clear demands to Russia,” 
asking the Russians to renounce “passportism” (that is, 
distributing Russian passports in neighboring countries) 
and to recognize how their interpretations of history make 
their neighbors “nervous.”
A British participant said that the relevance of U.S. nuclear 
weapons in Europe for deterrence is not self-evident, but 
cannot be ruled out.  In his words, “if there can be such 
disagreement over the utility of NATO theater nuclear sy-
stems between experts from overlapping backgrounds 
with similar intellectual reference points, then we should 
not easily conclude that we know how any potential ag-
gressor would ‘obviously’ regard, or disregard, them.”  It 
is indisputable that Moscow has taken U.S. nuclear wea-
pons in Europe seriously since the 1950s and has never 
ceased to demand their removal. 23
The NATO Allies recognize the growing importance 
for their security of China’s increasing military and 
nuclear capabilities and of Asia-Pacifi c security tren-
ds, but the participants in this workshop drew few 
inferences for NATO policy other than taking note of 
these trends. 
An American participant drew attention to “the implica-
tions for NATO of having to help deter, prevent or termi-
nate a large-scale confl ict in Asia, among Asian powers, 
possibly involving the use by them of nuclear weapons.” 
Determining what these implications might be requires ca-
reful examination.
A German participant said that NATO’s nuclear deterren-
ce posture may be a source of stability and peaceful chan-
ge in conjunction with the rise of major powers in Asia, 
and that there would be no need for the Alliance to modify 
its “to whom it may concern” doctrine.
Another German participant noted that China is increasing 
its nuclear forces in conjunction with an expansion of its 
regional and global power projection assets.  The upsur-
ge in Chinese military capabilities, nuclear and conven-
tional, has already raised questions in Australia, Japan, 
South Korea and other countries in the Asia-Pacifi c region 
about the long-term reliability of U.S. extended deterren-
ce.  China’s increasing military potential is likely to attract 
more U.S. political attention and greater U.S. military in-
vestments in the region.  As a result, the United States 
may well expect its NATO European Allies to backfi ll for 
U.S. forces diverted from Europe or the Middle East to the 
Asia-Pacifi c region, and to be prepared to contribute to 
operations in this region.  The NATO Allies will therefore, 
he concluded, need to recognize the changing balance of 
power in the world beyond the Euro-Atlantic region and 
take note of this in the new Strategic Concept. 24
* * * * *
The participants generally agreed that the workshop was 
helpful in clarifying issues and renewing ties between the 
policy and analytical communities.  A future workshop 
may address issues associated with the implementation 
of the new Strategic Concept to be published in November 
2010. 
23  For a discussion of the history of U.S. extended deterrence in the NATO Alliance, see David S. Yost, “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence 
in NATO”, International Affairs, vol. 85, no. 4 (July 2009), pp. 755-780.
24  For background on these issues, see Stephan Frühling and Benjamin Schreer, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept and US Commitments in the 
Asia-Pacifi c”, RUSI Journal, vol. 154, no. 5 (October 2009), pp. 98-103.
